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Abstract
By drawing upon McAuslan’s analysis of  the ideologies underpinning land use planning law, this paper
examines financial viability modelling and legal processes in the context of  local authority decision-making
related to property development on large urban sites. A local authority can make a site ready for development
by using ‘compulsory purchase’ powers to acquire land, by transferring that land to a property developer and
by granting that developer planning permission to commence construction. Analysis of  case law, academic
criticism of  viability modelling practices and a recent property development project highlight issues arising
when local authority planning departments use viability appraisals to legitimise decisions purportedly taken
in the public interest. An in-depth examination of  viability modelling within local authority estates
departments then opens a new site for critical inquiry of  local authority land acquisition practices. The
paper’s conclusions reflect upon how financial viability modelling shapes decision-making, despite questions
surrounding both modelling techniques and the outputs that viability appraisals produce.
Key words: compulsory purchase; local authorities; property development; planning;
viability.
Introduction
Local authority planning departments in England formulate and apply policies forproperty development in their areas. Local authority estates departments, on the other
hand, often use both the local authority’s landholdings and the local authority’s power to
‘compulsorily purchase’ privately owned land to stimulate property development activity. By
granting planning permission to property developers and by transferring both their own
and compulsorily purchased land to those developers, these local authority departments
facilitate the ‘assembly’ of  land for property development purposes.1
A type of  financial viability modelling device, called a development viability appraisal
(DVA), is integral to each aspect of  land assembly. Local authority planning departments
use DVAs in negotiations with property developers on such things as the amount of
‘affordable housing’2 a specific project should provide. DVAs are also a component of  a
common form of  conditional property development contract, known as a development
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1     Discussed in Antonia Layard, ‘Shopping in the public realm: a law of  place’ (2010) 37(3) Journal of  Law
and Society 412.
2     Lower-cost housing sold or rented below market value: see Ministry of  Housing, Communities and Local
Government (MHCLG), National Planning Policy Framework (MHCLG 2019) Annex 2. 
agreement (DA), made between local authority estates departments and property
developers to consolidate disparate urban landholdings into plots capable of
accommodating large-scale property development projects.
This paper identifies problems that emerge when local authority planning and estates
departments use DVAs as decision-making tools during land assembly. To analyse these
problems, the paper considers McAuslan’s well-known examination of  the ‘ideologies’
running through land use planning law.3 For McAuslan, this law includes legislation and
judicial decisions related to development control and compulsory purchase activity4 and
the ‘paraphernalia of  plans, hearings, appeals, notices, orders, circulars, agreements, etc’
that these activities generate.5 McAuslan’s account pinpoints three competing ideologies
that complicate decision-making within the context of  land use planning: first, that the
law exists to protect and serve private property rights; second, that the role of  the law is
to promote the public interest; and, third, that the law should promote public
participation in land use planning.6 This paper moves McAuslan’s ideas into a new area by
focusing on how councillors, local authority officers, third-party consultants and property
developers working on land assembly projects formulate and pursue a shared vision of
the public interest. The paper argues that this manifests most clearly in an assumption
that there is a public interest, first, in enhancing the monetary profit accruing from
particular projects and, second, in carefully controlling public participation in the
decision-making processes at play in this context. 
To illustrate how conflicting notions of  the public interest create tensions in land
assembly practice, this paper studies a recent project in Winchester (the Winchester
Development), a small city in the south of  England. The local authority participating in
the Winchester Development (Winchester Council) did so by attempting to address what
Harding has called ‘the ownership logjam’.7 This arises if  ownership of  landholdings on
an earmarked development site is spread across landowners who refuse to participate in
the redevelopment of  that land. To address this, Winchester Council granted a
preselected property developer planning permission to construct an agreed set of
buildings and used a DA with that developer to acquire those landholdings and thus
assemble a development site in an area deemed to be blighted by a downtrodden property
market and a lack of  ‘investability’. The ostensible goal was the construction of  new
buildings on a predefined site to leverage the provision of  urban housing and other public
goods and to bring associated ‘trickle-down’ benefits to the area through the creation of
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3     Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of  Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980).
4     When discussing development control, McAuslan examines how decision-makers determine applications for
planning permission (ibid 147). When discussing compulsory purchase, McAuslan addresses compensation
payable to landowners when public bodies expropriate their property rights (ibid 103). This paper does not
consider the compensation regime but, instead, discusses the law regulating the use of  compulsory purchase
powers.
5     Ibid 268.
6     For more recent discussions of  these ideologies, see Julie Adshead, ‘Revisiting the ideologies of  planning
law: private property, public interest and public participation in the legal framework of  England and Wales’
(2014) 6(1/2) International Journal of  Law in the Built Environment 174 and Emma Lees and Edward
Shepherd, ‘Incoherence and incompatibility in planning law’ (2015) 7(2) International Journal of  Law in the
Built Environment 111.
7     Anne Harding, ‘The rise of  urban growth coalitions, UK-style’ (1991) 9(3) Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 295, 314. See also Anna Minton, Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty-
First-century City (1st edn, Penguin Books 2009) and Peter Wyatt, Property Valuation (2nd edn, John Wiley &
Sons 2013) 427.
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jobs and an enhancement in land values.8 This paper examines, however, the tensions to
which Winchester Council had to respond when promised planning gains and perceptions
of  development viability exerted competing pressures. The paper also shows how a DA
functions as a type of  legal–economic hybrid that regulates the transfer of  compulsorily
purchased land from private to public ownership and then from public ownership into a
new form of  private ownership on terms conditioned by the outputs of  DVAs. The paper
then analyses how, as Henderson has put it, local authorities involved in this type of
property development activity treat land assembly and private profit ‘as a public interest
objective’ that trumps other policy goals.9
The tensions examined in this paper were highlighted in court proceedings related to
the Winchester Development10 but also emerged in various documents that Winchester
Council produced for consideration at internal meetings and that its officers presented to
a public inquiry convened to consider its use of  compulsory purchase powers. These
documents provide important empirical data because they record what local authority
officers and councillors read and said about DAs, DVAs and land assembly. The paper
also inspects the findings of  the Information Commissioner (IC) in response to public
complaints about the availability of  information related to the financial underpinnings of
the Winchester Development. Alongside this examination of  local authority decision-
making and financial viability modelling in the context of  the Winchester Development,
the paper probes other recent judicial decisions related to planning, DVAs and public
participation in land assembly processes. Taken together, this range of  sources reveals the
contradictions that emerge when the public interest dimension of  planning becomes
synonymous with the pursuit of  private commercial imperatives. 
The paper addresses these tensions in five sections. First, the paper introduces the
Winchester Development and elaborates on McAuslan’s analysis of  the ideologies at play
in planning law. The second section then discusses critical studies of  financial viability-
modelling practices, judicial decisions involving DVAs and aspects of  the Winchester
Development to analyse the tensions that emerge when planning departments and
property developers use DVAs to reduce or avoid any obligation to provide public goods,
such as affordable housing, which would otherwise be imposed as a condition of  the
grant of  planning permission. The paper’s third section then considers various access to
information requests to highlight conflicts related to public participation in the use of
DVAs. The paper then shifts focus to examine the land acquisition aspect of  land
assembly. It does so by analysing data drawn from the Winchester Development and by
considering the High Court case of  R (on the application of  Wylde) v Waverley Borough Council.11
This section unpicks the interrelationship between DAs and DVAs to analyse land
valuation and public procurement controversies arising from viability-led changes to local
authority–property developer DAs. The paper concludes by reflecting upon how financial
viability shapes local authority decision-making, despite questions surrounding the
robustness and objectivity of  modelling techniques, the underlying assumptions and the
outputs that DVAs produce.
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8     Winchester CC, The Winchester CC (Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011. Statement of  Case (22 March
2012) paragraph 8.4. This process has also been examined in legal and urban regeneration studies (see
Layard (n 1), Minton (n 7) and, for an American perspective, Debbie Becher, Private Property and Public Power:
Eminent Domain in Philadelphia (Oxford University Press 2014). 
9     Steven R Henderson, ‘City centre retail development in England: land assembly and business experiences of
area change processes’ (2011) 42 Geoforum 592, 599.
10   R (on the application of  Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin) (hereafter Gottlieb).
11   [2017] EWHC 466 (Admin) (hereafter Wylde).
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1 Silver Hill, Winchester
The choice of  the Winchester Development as the focal point of  this paper followed the
aforementioned Gottlieb judicial review.12 The decision to focus primarily on a single
project was also, however, a product of  the complex interplay between planning and land
acquisition decision-making and the explanatory detail required to highlight the specific
problems arising from the use of  DVAs in land assembly practice. Moreover, examining
a single project enables, paraphrasing McAuslan, a close examination of  the occasions
during land assembly when ideological conflicts arise.13 The Winchester Development
provides particularly rich insights because of  the frequency with which Winchester
Council and the Winchester Developer used DVAs in an effort to legitimise controversial
planning and land acquisition decisions. In addition, studying the Winchester
Development reveals limitations to the scope of  access to information laws as a means
for public scrutiny of  the DVAs that are crucial to land assembly processes.
The urban site that Winchester Council’s Estates Department14 identified in the late-
1990s as suitable for property development (the Winchester Site) consisted of  five
Winchester Council-owned landholdings, Winchester’s privately owned bus station and
other landholdings owned by various third parties.15 The Winchester Development began
when Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Ltd agreed, with the owner of  the bus station, to
redevelop that land.16 The Developer then attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach land
acquisition agreements with other landowners with interests on the Winchester Site.17 The
combination of  the Developer’s agreement in relation to the bus station, the fragmented
nature of  landownership on the Site and Winchester Council’s desire for development
illustrates why a local authority estates department and a property developer might agree a
conditional property development contract containing a land assembly mechanism.
Winchester Council’s Estates Department and the Winchester Developer signed a DA
on 22 December 2004 (the WDA), in which they agreed that the Development would
include various commercial buildings, a new bus station and at least 287 homes, of  which
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12   Gottlieb (n 10).
13   McAuslan (n 3) 269.
14   Winchester Council operates an Estates Department (Winchester CC, Constitution of  the City Council – Part 7
– Management Structure (adopted 26 June 2019)), which has been tasked with ‘maximising’ the revenue that
the Council’s land generates (as stated in part 7 of  the previous iteration of  the Constitution (adopted
7 February 2017)). Christophers explains the long history of  central and local government initiatives, often
involving privatisation schemes, designed to maximise revenues produced from local authority-owned land:
see Brett Christophers, The New Enclosure: The Appropriation of  Public Land in Neoliberal Britain (Verso 2018). A
current example is the One Public Estate project: Local Government Association, One Public Estate: Building
a Movement through Partnership (Local Government Association 2018).
15   Winchester CC, CAB1030. Broadway Friarsgate – Development Agreement. Report of  Chief  Estates Officer (February
2005) appendix 1. When this research began, documents related to the Winchester Development cited in
this paper were available on the Council’s website. Winchester Council has since redesigned its website and
some documents are no longer available. The author has copies of  documents cited in this paper available
for review on request.
16   Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Ltd was a property development company established specifically for
the Winchester Development. In 2010, its parent company (Thornfield Properties plc) entered
administration and Henderson Real Estate acquired the development company and changed its name to
Silverhill Winchester No 1 Ltd: see Winchester CC, CAB2085. Silver Hill Regeneration Project – Latest
Developments. Report of  the Chief  Executive (November 2010). The shorthand ‘the Winchester Developer’ is
used here for simplicity.
17   Matthew Bodley, Proof  of  Evidence (presented to the Public Inquiry held to consider the Winchester CC
(Silver Hill) Compulsory Purchase Order 2011) (May 2012).
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35 per cent were to be affordable.18 To enable construction to commence, the Developer
agreed to apply for planning permission19 and to continue its attempt to acquire all
required landholdings not in the ownership of  Winchester Council. If  the Developer
failed to acquire those landholdings, Winchester Council’s Estates Officers agreed that
they would attempt to complete the acquisition process using the Council’s compulsory
purchase powers and by leasing the entire Site to the Developer.20 This paper
consequently examines the negotiations that took place between the Winchester
Developer and Winchester Council’s Planning and Estates Departments until the Gottlieb
judgment determined that the Council’s decision to approve variations to the WDA was
unlawful. The High Court’s decision led to the collapse of  the Development in March
2016,21 so the decision to examine the Winchester Development means studying a project
that failed. Nevertheless, the longevity of  the project meant that the Council and the
Developer engaged with various legal processes. This variety provides multiple original
insights into how legal mechanisms regulate this type of  land assembly activity.
Much of  the law in this area, McAuslan has argued, is dominated by two ideologies.
On the one hand, McAuslan suggests, the courts often interpret and apply land use
planning law in a way that prioritises private property rights over other interests.22 On the
other hand, McAuslan highlights the tendency amongst the politicians and local authority
officers who formulate and apply land use planning law to construct and interpret that
law primarily in accordance with a broadly defined public interest ideology.23 Sections
226(1)(a) and (1A) of  the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) exemplify
the latter tendency. These provisions permit a local authority to make a compulsory
purchase order (CPO) if  it believes that expropriating third-party land would ‘facilitate …
development, redevelopment or improvement’ and would be likely to contribute social,
economic or environmental benefits to the wider area. In the context of  land assembly,
the public interest ideology underpinning these provisions often manifests in the use of
public powers to realign existing private property rights to enable land uses deemed to be
more socially and economically productive.24 This is a use of  legal mechanisms to resolve
a conflict between how public administrators perceive the public interest and the rights
of  a private property owner to use her land in ways that challenge the pursuit of
presumed public interest goals. While McAuslan suggests that there is a complex interplay
between these dominant ideologies in this and in other aspects of  land use planning, he
also argues that the content, interpretation and application of  law often diminishes the
role of  public participation. This is because public participation is seen as a threat to the
predominance of  these ideologies.25 According to this outlook, enhanced public
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18   Clause 5.3 of  the WDA called these the ‘required elements’. The WDA originally required 364 new homes,
but a Deed of  Variation reduced this to 287 (Winchester CC, CAB2603. Silver Hill Regeneration. Report of  the
Silver Hill Officers Project Team (July 2014) paragraph 2.4). The WDA is available, as of  16 October 2019, for
download in four parts, with variations in 2009 and 2010, from
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/a_copy_of_the_contract_between_h>. 
19   WDA, schedule 2, paragraph 3.3.
20   WDA, clauses 10.1 and 11.2.
21   Winchester CC, Withdrawal of  Silver Hill Appeal by Developer (Press release 7 April 2016).
22   McAuslan (n 3) 3.
23   Ibid 4.
24   Brett Christophers, ‘Geographical knowledges and neoliberal tensions: compulsory land purchase in the
context of  contemporary urban redevelopment’ (2010) 42(4) Environment and Planning A: Economy and
Space 856, 864.
25   Adshead’s more recent analysis of  public participation in land use planning law provides examples of
situations in which McAuslan’s critique still applies: Adshead (n 6) 187.
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participation in the substantive aspects of  land use decision-making might improve public
satisfaction with and produce greater clarity in processes, decisions and outcomes.26
Land assembly practices highlight conflicts between public interest goals, protection
for private property rights and public participation mechanisms. This paper focuses
particularly on how councillors, local authority officers, third-party consultants and
property developers use DVAs to determine how far land assembly projects should
comply with policies related to the provision of  affordable housing or the price property
developers should pay for local authority land. The paper also probes the tensions that
emerge when members of  the public seek to intervene in land assembly practices. These
tensions flow from a perception, on the part of  some local authorities, that these DVAs
are themselves a type of  private property and that disclosure of  them will be detrimental
to both a property developer’s right to maximise its profits and a local authority’s efforts
to promote property development in accordance with its perception of  the public
interest. Public participation thus creates, from the perspective of  these local authorities,
an interference with both private property rights and the public interest ideology
underpinning land assembly decision-making. By following McAuslan’s lead, this paper
examines what contractual agreements, judicial and ministerial decisions, central and local
government policies, documents submitted to and emanating from CPO inquiries and
reports related to local authority land transfers show about the legal mechanisms that
administrators and developers use to pursue their vision of  the public interest and to
restrict public participation in viability-related decisions.
2 Financial viability modelling, planning and affordable housing
The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) encourages planning departments to
assess the amount of  affordable housing required in their area27 and to set targets for
affordable housing provision on individual development sites.28 To do so, planning
departments commonly use actual and hypothetical projects on land identified as suitable
for residential development to assess the financial viability of  specific targets.29 Third-
party consultants then convert a proposed affordable housing target into a monetary
figure, which can be added to likely land acquisition, site preparation, construction and
other costs in DVAs relevant to the various schemes.30 A proposed target is ‘viable’ if
projected revenues sufficiently outweigh projected costs. A planning department can then
incorporate that target into its development plan as a policy priority to be considered in
relation to applications for planning permission. Planning departments can then seek to
ensure affordable housing provision through ‘planning obligations’, in a ‘section 106
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26   McAuslan (n 3) 269.
27   MHCLG (n 2) paragraph 60.
28   Ibid paragraph 62.
29   Brett Christophers, ‘Wild dragons in the city: urban political economy, affordable housing development and
the performative world-making of  economic models’ (2014) 38(1) International Journal of  Urban and
Regional Research 79. In addition to the texts referred to in this and in subsequent footnotes, this paper
draws upon Wyatt (n 7) 403–453 for its understanding of  viability modelling practices.
30   Patrick McAllister, Emma Street and Peter Wyatt, ‘Governing calculative practices: an investigation of
development viability modelling in the English planning system’ (2016) 53(11) Urban Studies 2363, 2366. 
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agreement’,31 in which a developer promises to provide affordable housing in return for
the grant of  planning permission.32
Recent research suggests that policy-making processes afford property developers and
landowners control over the formulation of  development plan targets because
consultants producing DVAs for local authority planning departments seek ‘buy-in’ from
those groups.33 Recent research also, however, identifies problems arising from ‘input
uncertainty’ when officers or consultants assess hypothetical property development
schemes based on estimated land values and development costs.34 This work criticises the
incapacity of  planning officers to challenge the conclusions that their consultants reach
and the paucity of  community involvement in testing viability findings and concludes that
DVAs are often insufficiently robust to have become so deeply embedded in the
processes that planning departments use to formulate policies.35 Moreover, most DVAs
prescribe a pre-determined value for private profit. ‘Profit’, however, is not simply a
product of  revenue exceeding expenditure. Rather, profit is itself  reconfigured as a cost
that can be added in a DVA to other costs. These total costs can be weighed against
projected revenue to determine if  a development is viable. Most DVAs conceptualise
profit as a proportion of  either projected total costs or estimated development value and
stipulate that a developer should be entitled to a profit of  15–20 per cent of  either total
costs or estimated development value.36 This entitlement is a given,37 so profit features
in these DVAs as a non-negotiable prerequisite to construction commencing.38
The use of  DVAs in local authority planning practice means that profitability often
takes precedence over housing need. But demonstrating that area-wide development
plans inscribe a financial logic onto the spaces in which people live addresses only one
problematic aspect of  the use of  viability modelling. As Christophers explains, an effect
of  the preoccupation with viability at a policy level is to ‘explicitly embed viability
considerations within another, connected domain: that of  on-the-ground negotiations
between local authorities and developers’.39 This happens because most development
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31   So-called because of  the operation of  section 106, TCPA 1990.
32   See, for example, London Borough of  Tower Hamlets, Core Strategy (2010), policy SP13, and Winchester
CC, Core Strategy (2013), chapter 10. See also the recommendations in the NPPF (MHCLG (n 2) paragraph
34) and the government’s accompanying guidance on viability modelling and planning (MHCLG, Viability
(last updated 1 September 2019)) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/viability> paragraph 001. 
33   McAllister et al (n 30) 2374, citing Anthony J Jakeman, Rebecca A Letcher and John P Norman, ‘Ten
iterative steps in development and evaluation of  environmental models’ (2006) 21(5) Environmental
Modelling and Software 602.
34   Peter Byrne, Patrick McAllister and Peter Wyatt, ‘Precisely wrong or roughly right? An evaluation of
development viability appraisal modelling’ (2011) 16(3) Journal of  Financial Management of  Property and
Construction 249; Neil Crosby, Patrick McAllister and Peter Wyatt, ‘Fit for planning? An evaluation of  the
application of  development viability appraisal methods in the UK planning system’ (2013) 40(1)
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 3.
35   Christophers (n 29) 94.
36   Charlotte Coleman, Neil Crosby, Patrick McAllister and Peter Wyatt, ‘Development appraisal in practice:
some evidence from the planning system’ (2013) 30(2) Journal of  Property Research 144, 158–161.
37   Antonia Layard, ‘Planning by numbers: affordable housing and viability in England’ in Mike Raco and
Federico Savini (eds), Planning and Knowledge: How New Forms of  Technocracy Are Shaping Contemporary Cities
(Policy Press 2019) 213–224, 218.
38   Christophers (n 29) 87.
39    Ibid 87. See also Neil Crosby and Peter Wyatt, ‘Financial viability appraisals for site-specific planning decisions
in England’ (2016) 34(8) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1716 and Patrick McAllister,
Peter Wyatt and Charlotte Coleman, ‘Fit for policy? Some evidence on the application of  development
viability models in the United Kingdom planning system’ (2013) 84(4) Town Planning Review 495.
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plans state that any application for planning permission for residential development on a
site of  or over a certain size will be rejected unless the applicant promises that a certain
amount of  the units to be constructed will be ‘affordable’. These policies make affordable
housing provision a public interest objective, but most development plans also envisage
three possibilities if  an applicant can show that provision of  the stipulated quantity of
affordable housing on-site would render development proposals ‘unviable’. First, a local
authority can approve an application if  the applicant promises to construct the same
amount of  affordable housing off-site. Secondly, a local authority can approve an
application if  the applicant promises to pay money in lieu of  either on-site or off-site
construction. Finally, many local authorities accept that development plan targets might
‘need to be varied’ further if  applicants provide ‘detailed and robust financial statements’
to justify that outcome.40
This creates an incentive for developers to argue that affordable housing targets
should not apply to their projects. A property developer seeking planning permission for
a large residential development project will usually be required to submit a DVA as part
of  its application. This can produce what Layard calls ‘the duel of  the spreadsheets’ if  a
local authority concludes that established targets should apply to a project, but the
developer applying for planning permission reaches a different conclusion.41 In those
circumstances, close scrutiny of  the inputs to DVAs is essential because, as analysis of
these practices has shown, ‘subjective’42 and ‘uncertain’43 estimated land values, site
preparation and construction costs and developer revenues are fundamental to showing
if  specific levels of  affordable housing provision would prevent a developer attaining a
‘competitive’ profit. 
While much of  this action takes place in behind-the scenes negotiations between
planning officers and property developers, planning law is a ‘funnel’ at which
controversies converge.44 In Kensington and Chelsea RLBC v Secretary of  State for Communities
and Local Government,45 for example, a property developer (Vannes) applied to a local
authority (RBKC) for planning permission for residential property development. RBKC’s
development plan policies had expired so the case considered the then extant version of
the Mayor of  London’s London Plan. The London Plan provides statutory guidance for
London Borough planning departments and stated that each borough should ‘encourage
rather than restrain residential development’,46 but that any site with capacity for 10 or
more homes would be expected to achieve 50 per cent affordable housing provision.47
Vannes and RBKC agreed that the site could accommodate 10 or more homes, but
Vannes’ application envisaged the construction of  nine ‘high-end’ homes and no
affordable housing. To justify deviation from the London Plan, Vannes produced a DVA
showing that any affordable housing would render the scheme unviable. RBKC’s
consultant, however, produced an alternative DVA showing that a development
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40   See London Borough of  Tower Hamlets, Core Strategy (2010) paragraph 4.4 and Winchester CC, Core Strategy
(2013) paragraph 7.22.
41   Layard (n 37) 217. See also Christophers (n 29) 91.
42   Layard (n 37) 221; McAllister et al (n 30) 2376 (in relation to DVAs used for policy formation). 
43   Crosby et al (n 34) 9; Crosby and Wyatt (n 39) 1728.
44   Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of  Diversity (University of  Chicago
Press 2012) 12.
45   [2010] EWCA Civ 1466 (also known as Vannes KFT v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC). Discussed in
Christophers (n 29) 93–94.
46   Kensington and Chelsea (n 45) [11].
47   Ibid [6].
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incorporating affordable housing would generate a significant profit.48 Based on the
consultant’s DVA, RBKC’s planning officers recommended that the Planning Committee
should reject Vannes’ application, which the Committee did. On appeal, however, a
planning inspector overturned RBKC’s decision and granted planning permission. The
inspector acknowledged that Vannes’ DVA contained unreliable data but felt that RBKC’s
consultant had used similarly unreliable data to assess the site’s capacity to achieve
viability while accommodating affordable housing.49 In the Court of  Appeal, Aikens LJ
concluded that the inspector was justified in disregarding the conflicting viability data, in
attaching more weight to the policy requirement that boroughs should encourage
residential development and in granting planning permission for a project that
incorporated no affordable housing.50
In a more recent dispute over incompatible DVAs, Parkhurst Road Ltd v Secretary of  State
for Communities and Local Government,51 Holgate J upheld a planning inspector’s decision not
to grant planning permission for a residential development that did not comply with the
London Borough of  Islington’s affordable housing policy. Islington’s policy states that
every new residential development should provide the ‘maximum reasonable amount’ of
affordable housing.52 For the purpose of  the disputed application, Islington produced a
DVA showing that the developer could construct 34 per cent of  the homes as affordable
housing.53 The developer, however, produced a DVA suggesting that this would render
development unviable.54 The differences in these DVAs came from conflicting valuations
of  the development site in its use prior to construction and, consequently, conflicting
conclusions as to whether the developer would draw an ‘adequate’ profit. Holgate J found
flaws with both DVAs but concluded that the developer had failed to justify its assertion
that 10 per cent affordable housing was the maximum reasonably attainable.55
The Parkhurst Road decision, like the decision in Kensington and Chelsea, flowed from a
judge grappling with a disagreement between an applicant and a local authority about the
use of  a DVA, based on questionable inputs, as a tool to determine affordable housing
provision. In a postscript to his judgment in Parkhurst Road, Holgate J noted the
‘proliferation of  litigation’ from viability-related disputes and implored the government
and professional bodies to address this.56 This ‘proliferation’, however, represents only
one problematic aspect of  the use of  viability modelling in this context. During the
Winchester Development, by contrast, the Developer and Winchester Council agreed that
no affordable housing needed to be provided. There was no ‘duel of  the spreadsheets’
here, although a brief  history of  the Development reveals that problems nonetheless
arose from the use of  DVAs. 
In 2007, the Winchester Developer had applied for permission to construct various
residential and commercial buildings.57 While the Council’s planning policies indicated
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48   Ibid [14].
49   Ibid [17]–[25].
50   Ibid [49]–[53].
51   [2018] EWHC 991 (Admin).
52   London Borough of  Islington, Core Strategy (2011) paragraph 3.3.30.
53   Parkhurst Road (n 51) [18].
54   Ibid [18].
55   Ibid [131]–[132].
56   Ibid [142]–[147]. See, in relation to this, Royal Institution of  Chartered Surveyors (RICS), Financial Viability
in Planning: Conduct and Reporting (1st edn, RICS 2019).
57   GVA Grimley LLP, Planning Statement Addendum on behalf  of  Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Ltd (January
2007) paragraph 2.
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that any buildings to be constructed on the Site should be no more than 14–15 metres
high,58 the Developer had argued that these requirements would prevent it from
achieving a competitive financial return59 and proposed a maximum building height of
over 20 metres.60 The Developer did, however, offer a policy-compliant affordable
housing provision61 and a policy-compliant ‘public open space’ payment.62 The Council
agreed to grant planning permission as soon as the Developer signed a section 106
agreement in these terms.63 The Developer did not do so, however, and, in August 2008,
informed Winchester Council that the 2008 economic downturn had diminished the
financial viability of  the Development. The Developer thus amended its application for
planning permission, preserving the proposed building heights but seeking an increase in
the overall permitted residential component and a reduction in the proportion of
affordable housing.64 The Developer also sought the removal of  the open space
payment.65 The Council’s planning officers reviewed the Developer’s viability
assumptions and agreed that the Development could support neither policy-compliant
levels of  affordable housing nor a public open space payment.66 Those officers
recommended that the Council should grant planning permission because the overall
importance of  the project to the area trumped the need for smaller buildings, on-site
affordable housing provision or an open space payment.67 The Council granted planning
permission in February 2009 after the Developer signed a section 106 agreement
promising that, if  it did not provide the required affordable housing on-site, it would pay
the Council an amount equivalent to the cost of  on-site provision.68
Winchester Council’s grant of  planning permission might simply indicate a one-off
desire to promote development activity following the 2008 economic downturn.
However, the Council then agreed subsequent reductions to the public gains on offer. In
October 2014, the Developer applied for permission to increase the proposed retail floor-
space, reduce the overall residential component and avoid any affordable housing
provision and any contribution in lieu of  on-site provision.69 A policy-compliant financial
contribution in lieu would have required a £7 million payment when construction
commenced,70 which the Developer stated would prevent ‘an acceptable competitive
development return’.71 Instead, the Developer proposed to pay £1 million on
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65   Ibid paragraph 1.8.
66   Ibid paragraph 7.3.
67   Ibid paragraph 7.5.
68   Winchester CC, PDC1012 Item 01, Report to Planning Development Control Committee (December 2014)
paragraphs 2.1, 3.4 and 20.1. Christophers notes other examples of  developers seeking to renegotiate
development proposals incorporating affordable housing provision (n 29) 92.
69   Winchester CC, PDC1012 Item 01 (n 68) paragraph 10.1.
70   Ibid paragraph 20.13.
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commencement of  construction and £1 million if  it accrued a 15 per cent profit on
cost.72 In response, the Council’s planning officers commissioned a review of  the DVA
that the Developer used to justify these claims. That review questioned some of  the
inputs to the Developer’s DVA73 but confirmed that the proposals would produce a
return below ‘an acceptable range’.74 Drawing upon their consultant’s assessment,
Winchester Council’s Planning Department recommended the grant of  planning
permission for a development incorporating no affordable housing and the
aforementioned £1 million payments,75 which the Council’s Planning Committee duly
confirmed.76 
The Winchester Development is significant, therefore, because it shows how a
Developer might begin planning negotiations with a relatively generous section 106 offer
before presenting revised DVAs to reduce the overall public benefits. An administrative
preoccupation with facilitating property development and a perception that the public
interest is served by using market mechanisms to determine when property development
takes place makes this possible. Moreover, critical analyses of  financial viability modelling
techniques and the outcomes in the Kensington and Chelsea and Parkhurst Road cases show
that unreliable inputs can produce disputed outputs and that DVAs are not always suitable
tools for legitimising decisions purportedly taken in the public interest.
3 Financial viability modelling and access to information
The preceding section of  this paper examined the tensions that can arise when decision-
makers seek to balance policies designed to promote profit-generating property
development and those directed towards the provision of  planning gains such as
affordable housing. This section now addresses public participation in that decision-
making by examining the publication of  viability data that the Winchester Developer used
to justify its 2014 planning application and by explaining the access to information law
relevant to planning proceedings. Examining this provides an opportunity to consider if
current access to information provisions counterbalance the close relationship between
notions of  the public interest and the pursuit of  a private profit.
The Local Government Act 1972 (LGA 1972) entitles members of  the public to
access copies of  reports produced for local authority council, committee and sub-
committee meetings77 and provides a public right of  access to background papers used
in preparing those reports.78 A local authority can, however, withhold disclosure of  those
documents if  an officer deems that they are exempt from publication.79 Material can be
exempt if  it relates to any financial or business affairs,80 and an officer can show that the
public interest favours non-disclosure.81 Recently, however, local interest groups have
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75   Winchester CC, PDC1012 Item 01 (n 68) paragraph 20.20.
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77   Section 100B(1).
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sought to challenge both the ideologies underpinning and flaws inherent to viability
modelling techniques but have found that local authorities often refuse to disclose DVAs
received from developers.82
Following receipt of  the Winchester Developer’s 2014 planning application,
Winchester Council had in its possession an affordable housing statement in which the
Developer summarised both the modelling techniques used to assess the economic
viability of  its proposals and the outputs of  its DVAs.83 The Developer did not, however,
provide Winchester Council with copies of  either its DVAs or detailed information about
the underlying inputs.84 Instead, the Developer provided this material in a ‘data room’.85
Having reviewed the available information, the Council’s consultants then confirmed that
they believed that the development proposition was not viable.86 The Council published
the consultant’s report and the Council’s Planning Committee granted planning
permission, having received and considered this report, the Developer’s affordable
housing statement and a planning officer’s report addressing the viability questions.87
The information that Winchester Council received raises questions about the material
that a planning committee should consider and that a local authority should publish for
public scrutiny. These questions have been addressed in recent High Court proceedings.
R (on the application of  Perry) v London Borough of  Hackney88 and Turner v Secretary of  State for
Communities and Local Government89 involved projects in which planning departments
granted permission for residential developments incorporating affordable housing levels
below those required in planning policies. Perry considered an allegation that Hackney’s
Planning Committee had failed to scrutinise the DVA used to justify the proposals. A
planning officer had reviewed the DVA and instructed a third-party consultant to examine
the data it contained. This consultant advised that the data in the DVA was robust and
the officer communicated this to the Planning Committee in a report assessing the merits
of  the developer’s application. The officer did not provide the Committee with a copy of
either the DVA or the consultant’s report, however, and the claimant, a local resident,
argued that this meant that the Committee did not have access to all the information
needed to reach an informed decision as to the application’s merits. Turner involved a
similar set of  facts, albeit that the claimant alleged that a planning inspector appointed to
determine a planning application could not reach a valid decision without having seen the
DVA a developer used to deviate from the London Borough of  Lambeth’s affordable
housing policy.90
The allegations in Perry and Turner mattered to the respective claimants because, as
Collins J put it in Turner, materials disclosed to a decision-maker should also be disclosed
to an objector.91 However, both Collins J and, in Perry, Patterson J concluded that the
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83   DP9 Ltd (n 71) paragraphs 5.4–5.17.
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85   Ibid paragraph 3.1.
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respective decision-makers had received sufficient information because officers provided
reports summarising the content of  both the DVAs and the third-party reviews.92 In
Perry, Patterson J deemed that there was no basis on which to require disclosure of  the
DVAs or the accompanying reviews and went on to say, citing an earlier decision of
Ouseley J in R (on the application of  Bedford) v London Borough of  Islington,93 that obliging
planning departments to disclose DVAs might ‘hinder’ negotiations between a local
authority and a developer, prevent development proposals coming forward and obstruct
the delivery of  public goods such as affordable housing.94 The cases also reveal a judicial
unwillingness to require planning departments to disclose a developer’s viability
assumptions if  there is a possibility that doing so might undermine a developer’s
economic interests. Moreover, these cases establish that a local authority planning
department will have adequately scrutinised a developer’s DVA if  it appoints a third-party
consultant to report on that DVA and if  a planning officer then communicates the
contents of  that report to the person tasked with determining the planning application.95
The Perry and Turner decisions indicate that Winchester Council had probably complied
with its obligations in the LGA 1972 when it provided for consideration copies of  the
Developer’s affordable housing statement and its own consultant’s report. This situation
does little, however, to address questions about a lack of  either openness in the use of
DVAs or mechanisms for informed public scrutiny of  the underlying assumptions.96 The
Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR 2004), which require a local authority
to disseminate certain types of  ‘environmental information’ in its possession97 or to make
that information available on request,98 provide a potential means for enhanced openness.99
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97   Regulation 4(1).
98   Regulation 5(1).
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However, the duty to disclose is limited by statutory exemptions and a perception that the
public interest might sometimes favour non-disclosure.100
The Winchester Development illustrates how administrators might balance public
interest arguments for transparency against public interest arguments for protection of
purportedly confidential data because, after Winchester Council granted planning
permission, a member of  the public requested disclosure of  the Developer’s DVA.101 The
Council did not hold copies of  the DVA, but it did acknowledge that it had some
background information related to it, which it refused to disclose.102 This information set
out the estimated costs of  the project, estimated sales and rental values of  the buildings
to be constructed and the estimated overall profitability.103 The applicant consequently
complained to the IC alleging that the Council had unlawfully withheld this information.
The Council argued that this information was commercially sensitive because disclosure
would undermine the Developer’s bargaining position in negotiations with residential
buyers,104 commercial tenants,105 building contractors106 and other local authorities with
which it might seek to engage in property development projects.107 While the IC
acknowledged that some of  the more detailed information related to construction and
land acquisition costs was so sensitive that the public interest favoured non-disclosure,108
the IC also concluded that there was a strong public interest in the disclosure of  the bulk
of  the information in Winchester Council’s possession, particularly in light of  the use of
the information to justify both the non-provision of  affordable housing109 and a
development that was larger in scale than local planning policy recommended.110
This outcome is consistent with recent First-tier Tribunal decisions on the application
of  the EIR 2004.111 In three of  those cases, members of  the public requested that local
authority planning departments disclosed DVAs that developers had used to justify
deviations from affordable housing policies. In Southwark, Greenwich and Clyne, the local
authorities involved argued that regulation 12(5)(e), which protects the confidentiality of
commercial information related to a legitimate economic interest, entitled them to
disclose only redacted copies of  the developers’ DVAs.112 In Clyne, the most recent of
these decisions, the London Borough of  Lambeth argued that the release of  a DVA
would place the developer at an economic disadvantage when negotiating with both
housing associations for the sale of  the proposed affordable housing stock and building
contractors whom the developer would pay to construct the development.113 The
tribunal rejected Lambeth’s arguments and ordered disclosure of  the full DVA, with the
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exception of  data related to a ‘rent-free’ period that the developer proposed to offer to
certain end-users.114 The tribunal did so because it concluded that the data in a DVA
provides only a temporary snapshot of  likely costs and revenues and disclosure of  data
that quickly becomes out of  date would cause no significant commercial disadvantage.115
The tribunals considering the Southwark and Greenwich applications reached similar
decisions to that in Clyne, noting the strong public interest in disclosure when DVAs form
the basis of  contentious planning decisions.116 However, these rulings simply reinforce a
type of  procedural public participation because they led, long after the substantive
planning decisions had been taken, only to disclosure of  some of  the information that
had formed the basis for the decisions.117 Moreover, there was a notable difference
between those rulings and the Winchester Development that highlights further limits to
access to information provisions as a tool for public participation in the substance of
viability discussions. Winchester Council did not have the Developer’s DVA in its
possession, presumably so that the access to information provisions in the EIR 2004
could not be applied to it.118 This type of  dynamic, in which the Developer, first, reduced
the proposed planning gains and, second, apparently did not allow its local authority
partner to hold a copy of  its DVA, has the potential to create suspicion about the basis
for and use of  viability assumptions. While a Winchester Council member did question
the integrity of  the Developer’s DVAs,119 there is no evidence that shows that the
Developer did provide an unreliable DVA. However, more openness might have enabled
Winchester Council to dispel any such suspicion in relation to the Winchester
Development, particularly given the use of  the DVA to legitimise controversial planning
decisions purportedly being taken in the public interest. Instead, the IC described the
information that Winchester Council did hold, in relation to the Developer’s DVA, as ‘not
extensive’.120 It is doubtful, therefore, that the published material would have enabled
intensive scrutiny of  either the Council’s decision-making or the Developer’s viability
assumptions even if  it had been released before the Council granted planning permission.
Timely publication of  detailed viability data might address scepticism about choices
administrators and developers make, enable members of  the public to contribute to the
substance of  live viability discussions and provide for meaningful public debate about the
reliability of  viability findings. 
The NPPF now recommends that DVAs, both produced at the plan-making stage and
in relation to site-specific applications for planning permission, ‘should be made publicly
available’.121 Some local authorities have also produced guidance stating that developers
will be expected to disclose DVAs used during the planning application process.122 This
guidance suggests that those local authorities are adapting their attitudes to transparency
when a property development project rests upon financial viability data. However, the
multifaceted legal and practical issues arising from the use of  DVAs still produce
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contentious and controversial outcomes and the High Court and First-tier Tribunal
decisions discussed here show how the use of  DVAs pulls local authority planning
departments in different directions when officers and councillors are asked to balance
private profit and public policy goals.
4 Financial viability modelling, local authority landownership and land assembly
Despite the criticisms of  DVAs outlined above, viability data has also permeated decision-
making in local authority estates departments. This paper has already explained that
Winchester Council’s Estates Department entered into a property development contract
(the WDA) with the Winchester Developer in which the latter promised to apply for
planning permission and then to construct a pre-agreed set of  buildings on the
Winchester Site. The Winchester Development thus provides an exemplar of  the volatile
relationship between property development contracts, DVAs and local authority land
acquisition strategies.
While Winchester Council owned some of  the landholdings on the Winchester Site,
its estates officers could not use the WDA to compel the Developer to commence
construction until two key pre-conditions had been satisfied. First, a ‘Site Assembly
Condition’ stated that the Developer’s promise to commence construction could only
become ‘fully unconditional’ either when the Developer and the Council had acquired all
the landholdings or when the Council received confirmation of  the validity of  a CPO
made to that end.123 A ‘Financial Viability Condition’ then added further conditionality
to the WDA by stating that the Developer’s promise to commence construction would
only become binding if  the Developer was satisfied as to the viability of  the development
proposition. The development would be ‘viable’ only if  a DVA, conducted after all other
pre-conditions had been satisfied, demonstrated that ‘the anticipated profit is not less
than 10% of  anticipated Development Costs’.124
The WDA was a legal–economic hybrid that made a guaranteed private profit a
contractual right and a preoccupation for the Council’s estates officers. This led to a series
of  profit-driven changes to the WDA. These changes began in 2008 when the Developer
produced a DVA showing that the WDA made the Development ‘unviable’.125 In
response, the Council changed the building specifications stipulated in the WDA to
ensure that the Developer did not breach the contract when it made its revised 2008
planning application.126 The Council also agreed to change the leasing mechanism in the
WDA so that the Developer would obtain possession of  the Site before construction
commenced,127 reducing the stamp duty land tax payable on the grant of  the lease but
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transferring the Site to the Developer earlier in the development process.128 Having then
received assurance that the Development was viable, the Council’s estates officers made
a CPO in 2011 (the Winchester CPO), which was examined at a public inquiry in 2012
(the Inquiry) and which the SSCLG confirmed in 2013.129 To demonstrate that
construction would begin soon after confirmation of  the CPO, the Council had informed
the Inquiry that the WDA committed the Developer to construct the then permitted
development.130 A Council officer also stated that, before the Inquiry, the Developer had
shown that ‘the scheme is viable’.131 This evidence presented the amended WDA and the
pre-Inquiry DVA as a mechanism produced in the public interest to guarantee that
construction would commence as soon as the SSCLG confirmed the CPO. 
Despite the assurances provided at the Winchester Inquiry, the pre-Inquiry DVA did
not discharge the financial viability condition in the WDA because it did not post-date
discharge of  the other pre-conditions. Moreover, the Council had not disclosed the pre-
Inquiry DVA, so there was no scrutiny of  the Developer’s viability assumptions during
the Inquiry. After the Inquiry, the Developer then produced the 2014 DVA that it also
presented to the Council’s Planning Department to support its application to amend the
2009 planning permission. That DVA showed that the Development would only be viable
if  the Council’s Estates Department agreed further changes to the building specifications
stipulated in the WDA.132 The Council’s estates officers agreed to these changes and the
Cabinet approved them in August 2014 (the 2014 Variations).133 Between 2008 and 2014,
the Developer had thus used three DVAs, each showing different outputs and drawing
upon its contractual entitlement to a guaranteed profit, to direct the Council’s decision-
making. By embedding a DVA within the legal underpinnings of  the Winchester
Development, the Developer had also gained significant control over the purposes for
which estates officers deployed the Council’s compulsory purchase powers. 
However, Winchester Council’s Cabinet approval for the 2014 Variations led to the
Gottlieb judicial review,134 in which a Council member claimed that the Council had
breached its public procurement law duties by failing to conduct a tendering exercise
before approving the Variations.135 The claimant also alleged that estates officers had
inadequately scrutinised the Developer’s DVAs and that the Council had consequently
approved a land assembly mechanism that was not in the public interest because it would
not enable the Council to lease the Site at a price equivalent to the ‘best consideration’
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reasonably available.136 Following the 2014 Variations, Winchester Council stood to
receive an annual rent of  at least £250,000, payable following the grant of  a 200-year lease
of  the Site, and a share of  the Developer’s profit if  that profit exceeded £2 million.137
Around the time that the claimant made his application for judicial review, however, the
Developer agreed to increase the minimum annual rent to £305,000.138 An applicant will
receive permission to seek judicial review if  they have a realistic prospect of  success139
and sufficient interest or standing to bring the claim.140 When the High Court considered
the claimant’s application, Dove J and Lindblom J separately noted that estates officers
had received professional advice stating that the Council would obtain the best
consideration reasonably available, despite the Developer having subsequently found
more money for the Site. The best consideration point consequently had a low prospect
of  success.141 The claimant did, however, obtain permission for judicial review of  the
alleged procurement law breach.142 Lang J then concluded that the 2014 Variations
amounted to the formation of  a new contract,143 that the Council had thus breached
public procurement rules and that the Cabinet approval for the Variations was void.144
The Wylde decision has since suggested that Lang J erred in her judgment in Gottlieb
because she should have concluded that the claimant did not have standing.145 The point
here is not, however, that a possible procedural shortcoming defeated the Winchester
Development. The underlying thread is the use of  DVAs. In 2015, an independent review
that Winchester Council commissioned indicated that, while the Council had received
legal advice stating that the 2014 Variations did not breach procurement rules, earlier legal
advice had stated that substantial changes to the WDA would trigger a tendering
exercise.146 This suggests that the need to produce a positive DVA may have led the
Council’s officers to advise councillors to take legally risky actions, purportedly in the
public interest, to facilitate both the transfer of  the Council’s landholdings and the
commencement of  a property development project.
Considered in isolation, the Winchester Development might only reveal how estates
officers struggled to reorder landownership on a specific site for presumed public interest
purposes while complying with the Council’s general public law duties. A brief  discussion
of  the project considered in Wylde, however, shows that other developers have offered
one proposition prior to a CPO inquiry before reducing the offer after the SSCLG
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confirms a CPO. In 2003, Waverley Borough Council (Waverley) and Crest Nicholson
Developments Ltd (Crest) signed a DA in which Crest promised to apply for planning
permission for and to construct commercial and residential buildings on a pre-selected
site (the ‘Waverley DA).147 Waverley promised to transfer land it owned on the
development site to Crest, and the parties agreed to work together to acquire the other
landholdings that they required.148 Waverley could then only compel Crest to commence
construction following discharge of  a viability condition that required a positive DVA
produced after all other pre-conditions in the DA had been discharged.149
Waverley and Crest failed to acquire the privately held landholdings on the
development site by agreement, so Waverley sought confirmation, in 2012, for a CPO that
would complete these land acquisitions.150 The SSCLG confirmed that CPO in August
2013.151 At the time of  the public inquiry, the DA obliged Crest to pay a one-off  lump
sum to Waverley of  no less than £8.76 million for the site.152 Before the inquiry, Crest
had produced a DVA that indicated that the development proposition, including this pre-
agreed minimum price, was viable.153 At this point in the land assembly process, however,
other pre-conditions in the DA had not been discharged, so the pre-inquiry DVA did not
discharge the viability condition.154
In May 2016, Crest then submitted a report to Waverley’s Estates Department
indicating that it would only discharge the viability condition if  Waverley amended the
minimum price in the DA to £3.19 million.155 Waverley’s consultants advised that this
amendment would still enable the Council to obtain best consideration for the transfer of
the land.156 Waverley approved the necessary amendments but did so without conducting
a tendering exercise. The claimants in Wylde thus argued that this breached Waverley’s
public procurement law duties, so Dove J’s judgment considers if  the claimants should
have permission for judicial review of  this allegation. Dove J concluded that the claimants
did not have sufficient standing because they had suffered no direct disadvantage as a
result of  Waverley’s decision to vary the minimum price.157 As with the earlier discussion
regarding the Gottlieb decision, however, the point in this paper is not to examine the
procurement law basis for Dove J’s judgment. Rather, the point is to emphasise that Crest
produced two DVAs in a relatively short period of  time, either side of  a CPO inquiry,
which carried around markedly different outputs. These manoeuvrings indicate that there
may be circumstances in which local authorities undersell land despite satisfying the legal
definition of  ‘best consideration’. The Waverley development specifically shows that
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147  Waverley and Crest have since agreed various amendments to the 2003 DA. A copy of  the latest
amendment is available, as of  15 October 2019, from
<https://www.waverley.gov.uk/downloads/download/544/brightwells_development_agreement>. The
2010 iteration of  the DA was operative at the time of  the CPO inquiry and the judicial review proceedings
discussed above. The author has a copy available for review on request.
148  The Waverley DA, clause 3.3.
149  Ibid clause 3.6.
150  Discussed in C J Ball (2013) CPO Report to the Secretary of  State for Communities and Local Government
[NPCU/CPO/R3560/70501]. 
151  Wylde (n 11) [6].
152  Ibid [5].
153  Ball (n 150) paragraph 183.
154  Waverley BC, Brightwells Regeneration Scheme. Report to Executive (24 May 2016) paragraphs 57–61.
155  Ibid paragraph 61. See also Wylde (n 11) [7]. 
156  Waverley BC, Brightwells Regeneration Scheme. Report to Executive (24 May 2016) paragraph 17.
157  Cited in Wylde (n 11) at [43]–[44], cross-referencing R (on the application of  Chandler) v Secretary of  State for
Children, School and Families [2009] EWCA Civ 1011 per Arden LJ at [77].
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some local authorities might accept significant reductions in the price that they receive for
land if  doing so serves the perceived public interest in facilitating property development
and reordering private property rights in favour of  property developers. The Winchester
Development, on the other hand, shows that public pressure can lead developers to offer
more money for the transfer of  land and that some developers will seek to develop sites
even if  DVAs indicate that they will not achieve the ‘required’ profit margin.
The opacity of  financial viability modelling and adjustable underlying inputs
complicate these issues. As noted earlier, local authority planning practice suggests that
some planning departments have started to adopt a more critical attitude to the use of
DVAs. A recent CPO inquiry for a property development project in Seven Sisters, North
London, indicates that some estates departments are also changing their practices.158 The
London Borough of  Haringey submitted its consultant’s review of  the developer’s DVA
to that inquiry,159 which suggests that Haringey embraced greater transparency than
Winchester Council. However, the report presented at the Seven Sisters Inquiry reveals
only the methodology deployed and the estimated profit. In that respect, the information
disclosed is generic and broadly comparable to that which Winchester Council published
during the Winchester Development. 
Financial viability modelling creates mistrust, which is heightened when DAs between
local authorities and property developers embed a guaranteed profit as a non-negotiable
entitlement. Moreover, this paper shows that the focus on private profit can be
detrimental to the provision of  public goods and to public revenue-raising. On its own,
this latter finding is unsurprising because conventional property development theory
suggests that local authorities should not seek to generate revenue directly from a
property development project but should simply promote projects that enhance the
‘investability’ of  an area and that produce economic benefits that ‘trickle down’ to the
locality. However, there are numerous examples of  projects in which an estates
department has obtained confirmation for a CPO only for its development partner to cite
viability concerns to delay the commencement of  construction and to extract concessions
from the local authority.160 It seems essential, therefore, that local authority estates
officers either establish and apply robust mechanisms enabling intensive public scrutiny
of  a developer’s viability assumptions or pursue property development approaches that
place less emphasis on a ‘required’ private profit.
Conclusion 
Financial viability modelling presents challenges to the local authority planning officers,
estates officers and councillors who engage with modelling techniques, the underlying
assumptions used in modelling practices and the outputs that viability appraisals produce.
This paper has examined judicial decisions and academic commentary that highlight
problems arising from contestable viability inputs and that question the use of  DVAs as
a tool for determining such things as the quantity of  affordable housing to be constructed
on a site. Judicial decisions in this context focus on disputes between local authority
planning departments and property developers, but this paper demonstrates that
questions are also likely to arise about viability modelling practices when a local authority
accepts the substance of  a developer’s viability outputs. Analysis of  the Winchester
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158  The project in question is for the regeneration of  the Wards Corner site. The development company
delivering the project is a subsidiary of  Grainger plc, a predominantly residential property developer.
159  The author has a copy available for review on request. 
160  In addition to the projects mentioned in this paper, notable examples include the Sevenstone, Westfield, Silk
Street and Brent Cross projects in Sheffield, Bradford, Macclesfield and North London, respectively.
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Development, for example, illustrates how a property developer might begin planning
negotiations with a local authority by making a relatively generous affordable housing
offer before presenting DVAs to reduce that offer over the course of  a long-term land
assembly and property development project. Further discussion of  the Winchester
Development in the context of  access to information law and judicial decisions related to
the publication of  viability data illustrates the paucity of  community involvement in
viability-related discussions. Viewing this through McAuslan’s framework for examining
land use planning law shows that public participation rights rarely enable members of  the
public to influence these discussions because access to information law often does little
more than entitle outsiders to review documents after a viability-based decision has been
made. In the context of  local authority estates practice, examination of  the Winchester
Development and the project discussed in the Wylde judicial review reveals that some
property developers produce DVAs showing markedly different outputs either side of
public inquiries convened to confirm the use of  compulsory purchase powers
purportedly for public interest purposes. These two projects also show how the use of
DVAs can raise questions about the price at which local authorities are willing to transfer
land to property developers and the way that viability outputs affect local authority
compliance with public law duties. Taken together, the findings discussed in this paper
show that current viability modelling practices should only form a basis for decision-
making in local authority planning and estates departments if  they are subjected to
intensive public scrutiny at the time that viability-based decisions are made.
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